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a prohibition case which stated: "If, when one case has been tried, the entire
panel of jurors sitting therein is disqualified from sitting as jurors in every
other case of a similar sort, trial courts will be so far impeded in the trans-
action of their business as to make enforcement of this act difficult, if not
impossible.
'34
It is submitted that the questionable objection of trial expediency is
not of sufficient import to merit proceeding to trial where fairness of the
jury is questioned. Conceding that the mere circumstance that a juror has
served and participated previously in the determination of a similar case,
need not disqualify him from jury service in subsequent actions relating to
comparable issues in the same category, it would seem that the "orderly
transaction of business" would not require the trial of similar violations
with identical witnesses consecutively before the same jury panel, particularly
where the offense charged is one toward which there is a pattern of deep and
bitter prejudice throughout the community. Moreover there is even less
reason for the practice in federal courts, since they have a much larger
population from which to select jurors than do the state courts which, para-
doxically, disqualify jurors from service under the present facts. Indeed some
states, including two of the smaller states, disqualify jurors by statute if they
have previously served within a proscribed period of time3 5 and even beyond
the proscribed period if the facts are identical, regardless of whether identical
witnesses are involved. 6
Thus the decision in the instant case seems wrong in theory and un-
fortunate in its effect. The reliance on the Wilkes decision and the basis for
rejection of the "totality of facts" approach appear to exalt supposition over
reality. As pointed out by the dissenting opinion:3
It seems improbable that any average man or woman, who has been
subjected to the preponderance of guilt, such as these jurors, both
collectively and individually would be capable of searching the state
of their minds for evidence of bias.
H. W.
MILITARY LAW-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SPECIAL MILITARY COURT-
MARTIAL WHERE DEFENSE COUNSEL Is NOT A LAWYER.-Culp, a student at
the Naval Preparatory School in the Bainbridge Naval Training Center, was
convicted in a special court-martial of stealing small sums of money from
others at the base. Neither the prosecutor nor the defense counsel was a lawyer.
Culp was given a bad conduct discharge and sentenced to four months in the
34 Accord, State v. Mays, supra note 21; State v. McMillan, 154 Wash. 29, 280
P. 737 (1929).
35 Me. R.S. 116, § 4 (4 years); R.I.G.I. 1956 § 9-1-7 (two years). See generally
Note, The Qualifications and Competence Required for Jury Duty in New England, 41
B.U.L. Rev. 232 (1961).
36 Brewer v. Inhabitants of Tyringham, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 196 (1833); McDonough
v. Blossom, 109 Me. 141, 83, 323 (1912).
37 Casias v. United States, supra note 1, at 621.
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brig, forfeiting $50 a month in pay for four months. The conviction was re-
versed by a Navy Board of Review which ruled that the special court-martial
was a judicial proceeding subject to the Sixth Amendment and that there was
no indication on the record that Culp "competently and intelligently waived"
his right to qualified counsel. On appeal Held: The Constitution of the United
States does not require that an accused be represented before a special court-
martial by a qualified attorney.'
The right to counsel in Federal criminal prosecutions has long been estab-
lished,2 and the right to assistance of counsel in state prosecutions for capital
offenses was found to be required by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.3 The right to counsel in state prosecutions for non-capital offenses
was long debated 4 but it is now established that the right of one charged with
crime to counsel is "fundamental and essential to fair trials." 5 The United
States Supreme Court has given no indication that the fact that the crime is
a misdemeanor rather than a felony in any way limits the right to be repre-
sented by counsel. 6
The language of the Supreme Court in decisions dealing with the right to
counsel makes it clear that the right established is that of representation by a
trained lawyer. 7
The purpose of the requirement of counsel is to insure that the protec-
tions of both substantive and procedural law are available to the defendant.,
The grant of power to the Congress to "make rules for the government
and regulation of the land and naval forces" 9 has resulted in some debate about
the degree to which the imperatives of the Bill of Rights apply to active mili-
tary personnel. 10 It has been said that "as yet it has not been clearly settled
to what extent the Bill of Rights and other protective parts of the Constitution
apply to military trials."" It has also been held that military law is a juris-
prudence which exists separate and apart from the law which governs the
operation of the federal judiciary. 12 Nonetheless, military courts, like the
State Courts, have the responsibility to protect a person from a violation of
his constitutional rights.'3
The Court of Military Appeals 14 has indicated that the protections of the
I United States v. Culp, 14 U.S.C.MA. 199 (1963).
2 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
3 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
4 See, e.g., Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1947).
5 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
6 See Gideon v. Wainwright, supra at 349; Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, at 520.
7 Gideon v. Wainwright, supra at 344; Powell v. Alabama, supra at 68-69.
8 See Willis v. Hunter, 166 F.2d 721, 723 (CA 10 Cir. 1943); Powell v. Alabama,
supra; Johnson v. Zerbst, supra.
9 U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, ci. 14. See Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953) ; Dynes
v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 15 (1858).
10 United States v. Clay, 1 U.S.C.MA. 74 (1951); United States v. Sutton, 3
U.S.C.M.A. 220 (1953); United States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428 (1960).
11 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 37 (1957).
12 Burns v. Wilson, supra note 9; Dynes v. Hoover, supra note 9.
18 United States v. Clay, supra note 10.
14 This is the highest appellate court in the military judicial system consisting of
three civilian judges appointed by the President of the United States. This court was
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Bill of Rights, except where expressly or by necessary implication inapplicable,
are available to members of the armed services.1 5
Congress in the comprehensive revision of military law eventuating in the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, attempted to provide many of the protec-
tions of civilian law to trials by courts-martial. The Court of Military Appeals
has held that it will give these statutory provisions the same meaning as has
been given to the constitutional provisions.' Consequently, a person in the
military today is accorded the full privilege against self-incrimination, 17 has
the right to compulsory process for witnesses,' 8 the right to freedom from un-
reasonable searches and seizures, 19 is protected against double jeopardy, 20 has
the right to due process of law in the sense of essential fairness,2 ' and is given
considerable freedom of speech within the limitations necessary in military
society.
22
The Uniform Code of Military Justice provides for trial of offenses in
three kinds of courts-martial. 23 General courts-martial try serious offenses and
may impose sentences of life imprisonment or death. 24 Special courts-martial
try offenses in the nature of misdemeanors and minor felonies and may impose
a maximum sentence of 6 months in custody, loss of pay, loss of rank and/or
a bad conduct discharge.25 Summary courts-martial try minor offenses, but
may not impose a bad conduct discharge nor confinement for more than 30
days.2
6
The Uniform Code of Military Justice provides that counsel shall be ap-
pointed for the accused in general and special courts-martial, but makes no
provision for counsel in summary courts-martial.
27
formed in 1951. See Walker, The United States Court of Military Appeals: A Long Over-
due Addition To The Judiciary, 38 A.B.A.J. 567 (1952).
15 United States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428 (1960).
16 Ibid.
17 UCMJ art. 31, 10 U.S.C. § 831 (Supp. V, 1959); see United States v. Jordan, 7
U.S.C.M.A. 452 (1957) (privilege violated by order to submit urine specimen); United
States v. Rosanto, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 143 (1953) (violated by order to submit handwriting
samples).
18 UCMJ art. 46, 10 U.S.C. § 846 (Supp. IV, 1958); see United States v. Thornton,
8 U.S.C.M.A. 446 (1957) (reversal for refusal to submit witnesses).
19 United States v. Ball, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 25 (1957); United States v. DeLeo, 5
U.S.C.M.A. 148 (1954); United States v. Noce, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 715 (1955); United States
v. Vierra, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 48 (1963); United States v. Brown, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 482 (1961).
20 UCMJ art. 44, 10 U.S.C. § 844 (Supp. IV, 1957); see United States v. Schilling,
7 U.S.C.M.A. 482 (1957); United States v. Padilla, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 603 (1952); United
States v. Zimmerman, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 12 (1952).
21 Examples of reversals because of unfairness include United States v. Ballard, 8
U.S.C.M.A. 54 (1958) (law officer protecting prosecution witness); United States v.
Richard, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 46 (1956) (disclosure by members of court on "voir dire" preju-
dicial to accused); United States v. Webb, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 70 (1957) (member of court
consulting textbook not in evidence).
22 See United States v. Voorhees, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 509 (1954).
23 UCMJ art. 16, 10 U.S.C. § 816 (Supp. IV, 1958).
24 UCMJ art. 18, 10 U.S.C. § 818 (Supp. IV, 1958).
25 Supra note 24.
26 UCMJ art. 20, 10 U.S.C. § 820 (Supp. IV, 1958).
27 UCMJ art. 38(b), 10 U.S.C. § 838(b) (Supp. V, 1959).
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In a general court-martial the prosecutor, defense counsel and judge must
be attorneys.
2 8
The provision for representation by counsel before special courts-martial
is more ambiguous. Article 27(c) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
provides, "In the case of a special court-martial--( 1) if the trial counsel is
qualified to act as counsel before a general court-martial, the defense counsel
detailed by the convening authority must be a person similarly qualified; and
(2) if the trial counsel is a judge advocate, or a law specialist, or a member of
the bar of a Federal court or the highest court of a State, the defense counsel
detailed by the convening authority must be one of the foregoing."
As can be seen from the above provisions the qualification of the trial
counsel determines what the defense counsel's qualifications must be except
where the accused chooses to retain civilian counsel. It is the responsibility of
the convening authority to "detail trial and defense counsel."129 However, with
the exception of the standards imposed by Article 27, there is nothing in the
Uniform Code of Military Justice nor the Manual for Courts-Martial which
limits the convening authorities' power to appoint trial or defense counsel.
In the hearings on revision of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the
then Judge Advocate General stated the need for prosecuting and defense
counsel qualified not only in civilian law, but also in military law. 30 Another
witness stated that one of the purposes of the legislation was to eliminate the
circumstances in which accused in courts-martial were represented by defense
counsel "who did not have the capacity ... to adequately protect the rights of
the accused." 31
The framers of Article 27(c) were careful to delineate different permis-
sible qualifications and the approximate equivalence of such qualifications.
For example, if the prosecutor is a judge advocate the defense counsel must
also be a judge advocate. However, as to opposing counsel who do not fall
within one of the five enumerated classes the Code is silent about what shall
be their equivalent qualifications.3 2 For example, it is now permissible to ap-
point as prosecutor a graduate of an accredited law school not yet admitted
to any bar against a defense counsel without any formal legal education.33
Prior to the decision in the principal case the Court of Military Appeals
had not ruled on the question of whether an accused before a special court-
martial had a right to a lawyer as counsel. However, the Court has always
insisted that an accused before a general court-martial be represented by an
attorney unless he intelligently and competently waives that right.34 In general
courts-martial the court has refused to allow the accused to be represented by
28 UCMJ art. 27(b) (1) (2), 10 U.S.C. § 827(b) (1) (2) (Supp. IV, 1958).
29 UCMJ art. 26(a), 10 U.S.C. § 826(a) (Supp. IV, 1958).
30 7 U.S. Cong. Documents, 1942 (1947).
31 House Armed Services Subcommittee Hearings, 81st Cong., March-April, 1949, at
623.
3- UCMJ art. 27(c) (1) (2), 10 U.S.C. § 827(c) (1)(2) (Supp. IV, 1958).
,3 Supra note 1.
34 United States v. Kraskouskas, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 607 (1958) (non-lawyer prohibited
from practicing before a general court-martial).
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lay counsel, even at his own insistence.35 The court has also, in general courts-
martial, reversed convictions because the accused was denied a qualified at-
torney during the pre-trial investigation. 36 In United States v. Tomaszewski3 7
the accused was convicted of larceny by a general court-martial. During the
pre-trial investigation the accused requested an attorney but was advised that
he was not entitled to one. The Court of Military Appeals reversed the con-
viction on the ground that the pre-trial investigation operates as a discovery
proceeding for the accused, and that it would defeat that purpose if a person
unskilled in the requirements of proof, or lacking in knowledge of legal de-
fenses, represented the accused.
The Court of Military Appeals has been no less zealous in protecting the
accused from incompetent counsel or inadequate representation, in special
courts-martial. In United States v. Rosenblatt38 the accused was convicted
by civilian authorities of "trespass less than larceny" and freed on bond.
Shortly thereafter, and notwithstanding the civilian prosecution, the accused
was charged with wrongful appropriation and sentenced to confinement at
hard labor for 2 months and given a bad conduct discharge by a special court-
martial. At trial no mention was made by the attorney for the accused of the
civilian prosecution. The Court of Military Appeals reversed the conviction.
It held that an accused is entitled to a fair hearing and to that end his counsel
is bound to present such evidence as is known and is available to him, which
would manifestly and materially affect the outcome of the case.
In United States v. Gardner,3 9 in a trial by special court-martial, the
Court of Military Appeals held that the accused's representation by his non-
lawyer defense counsel was inadequate as to one specification where it ap-
peared that the prosecution's case with respect to that specification consisted
only of a pre-trial statement by the accused, and the defense counsel permitted
the accused to take the stand and give testimony which supplied the only
independent evidence that the crime alleged had been committed.
In determining whether an accused has been adequately represented the
court has used various tests. In United States v. Parker40 where the defense
counsel's cross-examination of prosecution witnesses indicated he had not
consulted them prior to trial, it was held that the accused had not been ade-
quately represented since answers of the witnesses strengthened rather than
weakened the prosecution's case.
The issue in the principal case of whether an accused had a right to be
represented by a qualified attorney in a special court-martial was certified to
the Court of Military Appeals by the Navy Judge Advocate General after a
board of review in that office had set aside Culp's conviction and sentence. The
Board of Review found the plea of guilty improvidently entered, that cumula-
tive error was reflected in the record, and that there was denial of the con-
35 Ibid.
36 United States v. Tomaszewski, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 266 (1957).
37 Supra note 36.
38 13 U.S.C.M.A. 28 (1960).
39 9 U.S.C.M.A. 48 (1958).
40 6 U.S.C.MA. 75 (1955).
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stitutional right to be represented by counsel qualified in the law. The issue
as the Board of Review saw it was whether Article 27 (c) permits the appoint-
ment of a non-lawyer as defense counsel. The Court severely criticized the
Board of Review for deciding the constitutional issue in this case, and stated
early in its opinion that the conviction could be reversed without the necessity
of deciding the constitutional issue, because of the numerous errors which ap-
peared in the record. 4' Justice Ferguson began his concurring opinion by say-
ing, "First, I consider the question before us to be moot, for, whether it be
answered in the affirmative or in the negative, the action taken will have the
effect of affirming the decision of the Board of Review." '42 However, the Court
held that Article 27(c) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice permits the
appointment of a non-lawyer in special courts-martial.
Although all three Justices in the instant case were of the view that
Culp 43 was not denied any constitutional right by not having a qualified at-
torney, they all expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that a non-lawyer is
allowed to represent an accused in a criminal prosecution in a special court-
martial. 44
An important factor in considering the right of a serviceman to counsel at
a special court-martial is the great similarity between courts-martial and
civilian criminal trials.
Today military courts have the jurisdiction to try cases which are made
crimes by congressional enactment. 45 Similarly, the Assimilative Crimes Act46
permits courts-martial, under Article 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice,
to try persons subject to the Code for offenses under the laws of the particular
state in which the federal enclave is located.
Although special courts-martial have jurisdiction only over minor of-
fenses, they are empowered to render a bad conduct discharge.47 A bad con-
duct discharge adjudged by a special court-martial is sufficiently severe that a
sentence to 6 months and 24 days confinement and forfeitures has been held
to be less severe than a bad conduct discharge. 48 Therefore, any suggestion
that the consequences of a special court-martial conviction are so inconse-
quential that constitutional protections need not be invoked is without merit.
In justifying its decision, the Court of Military Appeals in the instant
case, stated that one of the reasons that an accused's constitutional liberties
have not been infringed is that the Uniform Code of Military Justice provides
for a system of automatic appeal. 49
However, as Justice Ferguson pointed out in his concurring opinion in the
41 Supra note 1, at 203.
42 Supra note 1, at 244.
43 Ibid.
44 Supra note 1.
45 UCMJ art. 134, 10 U.S.C, § 934 (Supp. V, 1959). This article permits prosecution
of servicemen for crimes and offenses by enactment of Congress or under authority of
Congress and made triable in federal courts.
46 62 Stat. 686 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1952).
47 Supra note 25.
48 United States v. Brown, 13 U.S.C.MA. 333 (1962).
49 Supra note 1, at 242.
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instant case, automatic appellate review is not a substitute for utilization of
legally trained counsel. In reality there can be no review of errors which do
not appear on the record and in many instances non-qualified counsel is lacking
in the knowledge of how to establish a good record. 50
It is submitted that the ruling in this case is inconsistent with the Court's
previous rulings on the application of the Bill of Rights to servicemen. This
decision seems to be incongruous with the purpose behind the enactment of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and also inconsistent with the accepted
notion in State and Federal courts that counsel trained in law is necessary to
assure the accused "due process of law." Gideon v. Wainwright and subse-
quent cases give reason to believe that the Court of Military Appeals will
probably reverse its position in a case in which the issue is more clearly pre-
sented. If the Court fails to reverse its position, there is every reason to believe
that the deprivation of right to counsel is so fundamental an error as to permit
the overturning of a special court-martial conviction, secured in the absence
of counsel, in a habeas corpus proceeding in a federal court.51
J.T.B.
50 Supra note 1.
51 Although direct review of a decision of a court-martial is limited to review by the
Court of Military Appeals, a writ of habeas corpus brings before a civil court the issue of
the validity of a judgment by the military. UCMJ art. 76, 10 U.S.C. § 876 (Supp. IV,
1958). See Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U.S. 128 (1950).
